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ADMISSION POLICIES FOR FAMILY 
REUNIFICATION OF THIRD COUNTRY 
NATIONALS IN THE EU  
 
After more than a decade of implementing the Family Reunification Directive 
2003/86/EC and in times when regional migration policies in the EU are being 
questioned, this fact sheet aims to provide insight in the commonality of the 
‘common’ European framework for family reunification for Third Country 
Nationals. By studying the variety in national application of the Directive’s 
optional provisions, it looks into the extent to which national Member States form 
part of and co-shape regional EU migration policy. Family reunification policy is a 
critical case to study the multi-levelness of migration policies and the interactions 
between the different (regional and national) governance levels, policy processes 
which are most relevant to gain insight into contemporary EU migration policy-
making.     
 
1. The EU Family Reunification Directive within the overall family migration 
governance in the EU: fragmentation of legal frameworks  
 
The European Union has adopted two Directives to create common standards for family 
reunification in the European territory. The Family Reunification Directive (Directive 
2003/86/EC) applies to the admission of Third Country Nationals (TCN) who join Third 
Country Nationals in one of the Member States, while the Free Movement Directive 
(2004/38/EC) for EU-citizens and family members concerns Third Country Nationals joining 
EU-citizens who reside or have resided in another Member State (different from their State 
of citizenship). Family reunification with non-mobile EU-citizens (citizens who have not (yet) 
enjoyed the freedom of movement within the EU) is not managed on the European but on 
the national level, as an exclusive competence of the Member States. This fragmentation of 
family migration governance for Third Country Nationals is visualised in the first table 
below. However, this does not include the complexity of exception rules for specific 
categories of TCN sponsors (a sponsor being a person who is joined by his/her family), such 
as holders of the Blue Card and Long-Term Residents (through the respective EU Directive), 
as well as sponsors with Turkish nationality, enjoying more favourable regulations. For 
clarification purposes, this fact sheet does not look into the mobility rules for family 
members who are EU citizens (whether they join a TCN or a mobile or non-mobile EU 
citizen), which falls completely under the Free Movement Directive.  
 
If we look into the share of family reunification as official migration channel for Third 
Country Nationals in the EU (figure 1), different patterns unfold. Depending on the Member 
State, the share of first residence permits issued to TCN vary between less than 1% 
(Poland) to 58% (Croatia), according to Eurostat data of 2014. Belgium shows a high rate 
of family reunification: more than half of the first residence permits issued to TCN has been 
issued for family reasons. Only Croatia, Luxembourg, Greece and Spain have slightly higher 
rates.  
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TCN  &       TCN              
EU: Family Reunification Directive 
(2003/86/EC) 
NAT: National legislation of 25 MS 
(not bound: UK, DK & IR: national law) 
TCN  & EU/mob NAT     
EU: Free Movement Directive 
(2004/38/EC) 
NAT: National legislation of 28 MS 
TCN &(non-mob)NAT     
NAT: National legislation of 28 MS 
EU   & TCN/EU/NAT             
EU: Free Movement Directive 
(2004/38/EC) 
 
 
Table 1: Fragmentation of legal frameworks for family migration governance in the EU  
 
 
Figure 1: Share of first residence permits for TCN immigrants – by reasons (2014). Source: Eurostat 
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2. The EU Family Reunification Directive revisited: analysis of the current 
implementation of its optional provisions  
Legal framework 
 
This study looks into the application of the EU Family Reunification Directive (2003/86/EC) 
in the 25 Member States that are bound by this Directive. The United Kingdom, Denmark 
and Ireland are not bound by the Directive, but manage family reunification of Third 
Country Nationals as an exclusive national competence (Considerations, n° 17 & 18, 
Directive 2003/86/EC). As such, they are not considered in this study. 
 
This Directive confers a right to family reunification to Third Country Nationals with a 
regular stay in an EU Member State (Art. 1 & Art. 3), who need a permit for at least one 
year with reasonable prospects of permanent residence (Art. 3) in order to be joined by 
TCN family members. It is mandatory that spouses and minor unmarried children are 
considered as eligible family members (Art. 4§1). Apart from mandatory criteria which are 
expected to be shared by all bound Member States The Directive further establishes various 
optional provisions for the admission of TCN family members, left to the discretionary 
competences of the Member States. This study looks into the contemporary national 
variation in the application of key optional provisions for the admission of Third Country 
National family members. 
 
Firstly, we consider three optional provisions that give Member States the possibility to 
exercise their discretionary competences to extend the right to family reunification. More 
specifically three provisions extend eligibility onto other family members:  
- 1: unmarried partners (Art 4§3) 
- 2: dependent parents (Art 4§2) 
- 3: dependent unmarried adult children (Art 4§2) 
Secondly, we analyse four optional provisions that allow Member States to restrict the 
right to family reunification for TCN through requirements prior to admission. The Directive 
does not impose any mandatory admission criteria an sich but allows the Member States to 
do so within their discretionary competences:  
- 4: accommodation requirements (Art 7§1) 
- 5: economic resources (Art 7§1) 
- 6: integration or language requirements (Art 7§1) 
- 7: minimum residence period for sponsor (Art 8§1) 
 
These optional provisions under scrutiny can be considered as the most relevant optional 
provisions, in terms of their potential effect in limiting or extending family reunification 
patterns. However, they do not comprise all optional provisions in the Directive. Due to data 
limitations (cfr. description of data source below) we do not look into the minimum age for 
sponsor and partner (which can be set at a maximum of 21 years)(Art. 4§5) for example, 
nor the eligibility of adopted children or children of whom custody is shared (Art. 4§1) or 
the requirement for the sponsor to have a health insurance for the family (Art. 7§1). 
Moreover the Directive refers to public policy, security or health grounds to be taken into 
consideration for refusing family reunification (Art. 6 §1&§2), provisions which are in 
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practice applied by all Member States. Furthermore, the Directive indicates clearly that 
more favourable national regulations are allowed, stating that “this Directive shall not affect 
the possibility for the Member States to adopt or maintain more favourable provisions” (Art. 
3 §5). This is the case in Portugal - to name just one example - where other family 
members including brothers and sisters are allowed.  
 
Analysis 
 
To map the national variation in application of the selected optional provisions as outlined 
above, this study is based on the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) data of 20141 
and additional verification by national experts2.  
 
We classify the 25 Member States that are bound by the Directive (i.e. all MS except UK, 
Ireland and Denmark) according to the country’s national regulations. If the MS does apply 
the optional provision as main rule for one or more major categories of TCN family 
reunification, it is codified as ‘YES’, if it does not (or only exceptionally or by discretion) 
apply the provision, it is defined as ‘NO’. This division has to be understood as a general 
direction in which the country tends to apply the provision. The study identifies but does not 
further analyse different subcategories (gradations) that nuance the application of the 
provision. This illustrates that policy measures cannot easily be reduced to black-and-white 
situations.  
 
The maps below show for each of the seven identified optional provisions the application in 
the 25 Member States (‘YES’ or ‘NO’ – indicated by the colours in the map): three 
provisions extending the family reunification right to additional family members and four 
provisions restricting the family reunification right by establishing admission criteria. For all 
the discussed provisions, potential variation in application is mentioned. However, these 
subcategories should not be interpreted as a complete overview of national variation, which 
is unfeasible in the scope of this study. The countries stated by each of these subcategories 
are listed by way of example, but do not comprise exhaustive lists of Member States 
applying such regulations.  
                                                          
1 Information was obtained from the following MIPEX indicators, which score MS’s application into 3 categories 
(0%, 50%, 100%)(http://www.mipex.eu/download-pdf): Indicator 24a: Eligibility of partners other than spouses; 
Indicator 26: Eligibility of dependent parents/grandparents; Indicator 27: Eligibility of dependent adult children; 
Indicator 30a: Accommodation conditions; Indicator 30b: Economic resources requirement; Indicator 28: Pre-entry 
integration requirement (i.e. pre-departure language measure or Pre-departure integration measure e.g. 
social/cultural); Indicator 21: Required residence period of sponsor. This study has reconsidered this information 
into a binary system of YES and NO.   
2 About 60 national experts have been contacted, of which 23 have provided a response that verified or corrected 
our information and/or provided additional information for 18 of the 25 studied Member States. In other words, 
72% of the used MIPEX data has been verified by national experts. In addition, we have consulted secondary 
information (publications). In follow-up, 2 responses were marked ‘unknown/unclear’ because MIPEX-info and 
additionally consulted sources were unclear or contradictory, and 9 responses were given a different value, 
because sufficient confirmation for alternative coding was obtained from additionally consulted sources. 
 
 
5 
 
 
 
 
Extending family reunification rights  
 
Optional provision 1: eligibility of 
unmarried partners (Art. 4§3) 
 
YES:  
Austria, Belgium, Croatia, Czech Rep., 
Finland, Germany, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, 
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden 
(* Malta= unclear/unknown)  
Variation 
- Including unregistered partners in a 
stable long-term relationship (e.g. BE, ES, 
FI, NL, PT, SE, SI) 
- Only registered partners  
(e.g. AT, CZ, DE, LT, LU)  
- Only same-sex partners  
(e.g. AT, DE)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
TCN family reunification with TCN unmarried partners is accepted in the majority of the 
Member States. However, also a large group of countries refuses to include unmarried 
partners in the scope of family: apart from France, Italy & Greece, mainly Eastern 
European countries are opposed.   
 
COUNTRY ABBREVIATIONS 
AT - Austria    FI - Finland   MT - Malta 
BE - Belgium     FR - France   NL - Netherlands 
BG - Bulgaria   HR - Croatia     PL - Poland 
CY - Cyprus     HU - Hungary    PT - Portugal 
CZ - Czech Republic   IT - Italy   RO - Romania 
DE - Germany   LT - Lithuania   SE - Sweden 
EE - Estonia    LU - Luxembourg  SI - Slovenia 
EL - Greece   LV - Latvia   SK - Slovakia 
ES - Spain 
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Optional provision 2: eligibility of 
dependent parents (Art. 4§2a) 
 
YES:  
Czech Rep., Estonia,  Hungary, Italy, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Portugal, 
Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, 
Sweden 
 
Variation 
- Criteria of dependency, such as financial 
status, health status, pension age and 
marital status 
(e.g. ES, EE, IT, LT, SE) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Optional provision 3: eligibility of 
dependent unmarried children 
(Art. 4§2b) 
 
YES:  
Bulgaria, Czech Rep., Estonia, Hungary, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Portugal, 
Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, 
Sweden  
(* Latvia= unclear/unknown)  
Variation 
- Criteria of dependency, such as marital 
status, financial dependency and health 
status  
(e.g. BG, CZ, EE, ES, HU, LU, RO, SK)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Only a minority of the Member States considers TCN dependent adult children eligible.  
The majority of the Member States does not consider TCN dependent parents eligible for 
family reunification with a TCN sponsor.  
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 Restricting family reunification rights 
 
 
 
 
Optional provision 4: 
requirement of adequate 
accommodation (art. 7§1a) 
 
YES:  
all Member States except Croatia, 
Finland, Netherlands and Slovenia 
 
Variation 
- Complying with general health and 
safety or housing standards 
(e.g.  AT, BE, BG, CY, CZ, DE, EE, FR, 
IT, LU, MT, RO)  
- Size requirements  
(e.g. FR) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Optional provision 5: 
requirement of sufficient 
economic resources (Art. 7§1c) 
 
YES:  
All Member States 
 
Variation 
- In relation to amount of minimum 
support, minimum income or minimum 
subsistence level   
(e.g. BE, ES, FR, FI, HR, MT, NL, RO, 
SK)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
All Member States impose certain economic resources requirements related to self-
subsistence or stable and regular economic resources of the family. However there is a 
large variation in required proof, excluded income sources (such as welfare benefits) and 
economic reference level (if specified), often related to number of family members.  
The large majority of the Member States applies accommodation requirements as a 
condition for TCN family reunification.  
.  
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Optional provision 6: 
requirement of prior 
integration or language 
knowledge (Art. 7§2) 
 
YES:  
Austria, France, Germany, Netherlands 
  
Variation 
- Binding civic integration test  
(e.g. NL) 
- Binding language test or proof of 
language knowledge  
(e.g. AT, DE, NL) 
- Non-binding verification of civic 
integration or language knowledge 
(e.g. FR) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Optional provision 7: 
requirement of minimum 
period of residence sponsor 
(Art. 8) 
 
YES:  
Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech 
Rep., Estonia, France, Germany, 
Greece, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, 
Netherlands, Poland, Slovenia, Spain 
 
Variation 
- Differences in length:  
from  
3 months > … ≤ 1 year  
   (e.g. BE, NL 1 year)  
to 
≥2 years 
   (e.g. CY, EE, EL, PL 2 years)  
 
Only some Member States require from the TCN family member to fulfill prior (civic) 
integration and/ or language requirements for family reunification. 
A large group of Member States requires a minimum period of residence of the TCN 
sponsor prior to the reunification with a TCN family member. 
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First conclusions 
 
This analysis of the application of optional provisions in the EU Member States shows that in 
this common legal framework for TCN family migration, Member States use the optional 
provisions to exercise discretionary competences in very diverging ways, most likely 
according to diverging national policy preferences. With regard to the seven provisions 
under scrutiny in this study, Member States differ most with regard to the eligibility of 
dependent parents, the eligibility of dependent unmarried adult children, the pre-departure 
integration or language requirements and the minimum period of prior residence of the 
sponsor. Further qualitative research is needed to better understand the patterns of the 
individual Member States.  
 
Despite the common legal framework of the EU Family Reunification Directive already in 
vigour for more than ten years, the application of the optional provisions for TCN family 
migration still shows a strong variation among the Member States. On the one hand, this 
illustrates an absence of uniformity. On the other hand, the extent to which the Directive 
initially aimed to create a strong common legal framework on family migration can be 
questioned. Regional migration policy reflects and is based on the interests of the individual 
Member States, which form an inherent part of the EU policy. From the beginning, the 
common framework goes hand in hand with the request for national discretionary 
competences, as illustrated in the paragraph below on positions in the public consultation 
on this Directive. As such, the policy implementation can be read as a continuation or 
mirror of the policy-making processes in force in establishing the Directive. In both 
developments, interactions have been taking place between the EU and the Member States 
as well as between the Member States among each other.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Multi-levelness of the EU Family Reunification Directive in policy development and 
implementation 
 
EU Family 
Reunification 
Directive 
EU EU 
Policy development Policy implementation 
MS
S 
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S 
MS
S 
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3. Understanding the commonality of EU family migration policy for TCN: 
Multi-levelness and relations between governance levels conceptualised 
 
Regulation of international migration has traditionally been a competency of the Nation 
State, yet as this fact sheet shows, in current times this competence has become dispersed 
over various government levels. In parallel, we find a recent literature surge on multilevel 
governance of migration policies, involving a line of scholars studying how levels 
interact with each other and how various patterns of relations between national and EU 
institutions take shape (Geddes & Scholten, 2014; Scholten & Penninckx, 2016; Zincone & 
Caponio, 2006; Luedtke, 2009; Givens & Luedtke, 2004). Geddes and Scholten (2014a) 
distinguish three patterns of Europeanisation of immigration, which are summarised in 
Scholten & Penninxk (2016, p. 96) as:  
-  centralist Europeanisation (loss of control for Nation States); 
-  localist Europeanisation (intergouvernmentalism) 
-  transgovernmentalist Europeanisation (balancing) 
The latter authors add decoupling Europeanisation (absence of coordination) as a fourth 
type.  
 
The case of the Family Reunification Directive confirms the description of 
transgovernmentalist Europeanisation: “governments seek cooperation in a European 
setting, even ceding some power and control to EU institutions, in order to gain a firmer 
grip on immigration, to the benefit of the Nations as well […] the national and European 
levels systematically connected rather than one or the other being in control.” (Scholten & 
Penninxk, 2016, p. 96). In other words, the TCN family migration policy in the EU is neither 
top-down, nor bottom-up, but a delicate balancing of national and supranational interests.  
Indeed, the mere adoption of a common Directive in itself stands as a clear example of 
ceding control to the EU level, whereas the wide variation in national rules as a 
consequence of a large number of optional provisions, shows that discretionary 
competences situated at the national policy level are just as important for the outcome. 
Concomitantly, EU Member States are strongly involved in the development of the common 
framework, to push forward national policy preferences and incorporate opt-out or op-in 
provisions. For example, in the case of the discussed Family Reunification Directive, there 
are accounts of strong influence of a number of Member States on the adoption of the 
clause on integration measures (Art 7§1), such as Groenendĳk’s (2004) research finding 
that integration as a condition for residence rights was introduced to the European agenda 
by a select group of Member States, most notably the Netherlands, Germany, and Austria.  
Another example of Member State driven policy processes is the - unsuccessful - attempt 
led by the Dutch government to re-open the Family Reunification Directive in order to 
realign national and EU interests in this policy area: “ […] the Netherlands is lobbying other 
Member States for a renegotiation that leads to more restrictions, less harmonisation, and a 
fundamental change of scope” (Huddleston, 2011). The context of this matter is the public 
consultation process organised by the European Commission between November 2011 and 
March 2012 in order to collect opinions on how to have more effective rules on family 
reunification at EU level and to provide factual information and data on the application of 
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the Directive. The questions for this consultation were formulated in the Green paper on 
Directive 2003/86/EC of 15 November 2011 (COM(2011) 735 final). In the summary of 
stakeholder responses to this public consultation, we observe conflicting positions affecting 
the outcome of the consultation process, i.e. the decision not to re-open the Directive. Most 
Member States did not advocate reopening the Directive (only the Netherlands explicitly did 
so), some Member States stating that there were no major problems with current provisions 
and some expressing concern that any modifications might limit the competence of Member 
States. It was generally felt that the discretion of Member States on family reunification 
given in the Directive should not be reduced. Integration was highlighted by the majority of 
Member States as a policy issue of national competence, opposing to bring rules on this 
matter on EU level. However, a few Member States suggested changes to give Member 
States more flexibility to introduce restrictive provisions or explicitly allowing pre-entry 
measures (on which the respective provision is unclear). The Netherlands advocated a 
series of amendments involving additional restrictions and a more binding integration policy 
stressing migrants’ responsibility (European Commission, 2012).   
In the literature, Europeanisation is predominantly conceived as a vertical process in which 
Member State governments strive to ‘upload’ their preferences to the European level in the 
negotiation of European norms, and ‘download’ these norms when transposing European 
regulation into national policy (Bonjour & Vinck, 2013). This traditional view ignores the 
importance of transfer among Member States. Such exchange of ideas, discourses, and 
policies where there is no pressure from the EU, is commonly referred to as horizontal 
Europeanisation (Bonjour & Vinck, 2013, Dolowitz & March, 2000). For example the 
application of optional clauses as well as the interpretation of mandatory and optional 
provisions, often involves exchange and ‘mimicking’ among Member States (where certain 
MS take the lead and others follow). The case of the Family Reunification Directive again 
provides a clear example of this process. For example, research (Bonjour, 2014) shows a 
domino effect in the adoption of integration measures as a condition for residence. The 
Netherlands was the first to introduce ‘civic integration abroad’ policies in relation to 
residence rights, its example has been followed by Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, and 
the UK. Through qualitative discourse analysis, Bonjour shows clearly how Member States 
influenced each other and concludes that: “The only actors promoting the transfer of pre-
departure integration measures were national governments. For these governments, 
representing such measures as a ‘common practice’ among Member States was a strategy 
to build legitimacy for restrictive reform.” (Bonjour, 2014, p.203). It should however be 
underlined that this statement has regard to pre-departure integration measures as an 
admission condition, and not (pre-departure) integration measures in general, for example 
as incorporated in the EU Integration Action Plan. In any case, the influence Member States 
might have on each other regarding the application of optional clauses or interpretation of 
provisions, deserves more research attention. For example, from data of the research 
projects MIPEX3 and DEMIG4, we observe at first sight some indications of possible trends, 
such as the evolution of broadening the scope of partnerships from marriage to unmarried 
partners (e.g. Spain 2009, Austria 2010 and Slovenia 2011) and a trend of introducing or 
raising economic resources requirements (e.g. Netherlands 2004, Finland 2004, Greece 
                                                          
3 http://www.mipex.eu/ 
4 http://www.imi.ox.ac.uk/data/demig-data 
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2006, Austria 2006, France 2007, Luxemburg 2008, Italy 2008/2009, Poland 2009, Sweden 
2010, Belgium 2011, Czech Republic 2013). This information and potential trends are 
however in need of confirmation based on solid empirical info of all Member States.  
 
The analytical distinction between vertical and horizontal Europeanisation is somewhat 
contested by Block & Bonjour (2013). According to their analysis, so-called ‘horizontal’ 
exchanges between Member States occur ‘up there’ at the EU level, as the development of 
migration policies at EU level is exactly a catalyst opening up networks, interaction 
dynamics and new channels for the circulation of information and policy perspectives. 
Negotiations on binding EU law are occasions for national civil servants, politicians and non-
state actors to meet and learn about each other’s policies, which can inspire them to 
introduce reforms at home (Block & Bonjour, 2013, pp. 2010-2011).  
 
The Family Reunification Directive is an exemplary case of the complex mechanisms at play 
in transgovernmental Europeanisation of migration policies, and shows how a single 
legislative instrument can both constrain and empower national governments at the 
same time (Block & Bonjour, 2013). The Directive has undeniably constrained the Members 
States from completely closing the door on TCN family migration, by guaranteeing a basic 
right to family life and setting minimum standards. On the other hand, this study has shown 
how much the door is left open for national control through optional provisions (‘may 
clauses’) and room for interpretation. As a result, there is a “[…] constant struggle 
between national governments and the EU about the amount of discretion states have 
in interpreting EU directives” (Scholten & Penninckx, 2016, pp. 91). This can be observed in 
various cases in which the EU puts clear limits to the national competence and room for 
interpretation. Rulings by the European Court of Justice on the case Chakroun in 2010 (C-
578/08) and the case K & A in 2015 (C-134-14), both regarding optional provisions of the 
Family Reunification Directive, illustrate this ongoing struggle. In the case Chakroun, the 
Court of Justice ruled that a differentiated income requirement for newly formed families in 
comparison to reunified families in the strict sense (previously existing family ties), as was 
applied by the Netherlands at the time, was not in compliance with the Directive. 
Consequently, the Netherlands adapted national law to comply with the ruling. In the case 
K & A, the Court interprets the lawfulness of a test on the host State’s language and society 
as application of the provision on integration requirements with reference to proportionality 
considerations.   
 
From the processes discussed in this section, questions for further research arise, such 
as ‘How do Member States exactly influence each other in transposition or interpretation of 
the provisions?’; ‘Where and how do EU institutions draw the line of the EU legal framework 
and national competence for TCN family reunification?’ or ‘(How) Do Member States 
continue co-shaping this legal framework to this day?’. More empirical research and 
theoretical contributions would complement insights of scholars we have introduced here.  
In conclusion, the commonality of the EU Family Reunification Directive has to be 
understood in continuous relation to the national entity. National interests and regulations 
form an inherent part of regional policy, in which both governance levels are interconnected 
and a delicate balancing of national and supranational interests is sought, as an illustration 
of transgovernmentalist Europeanisation. 
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